By Priye S. Torulagha
Introduction
Fifty-six years after the Nigerian – Biafran War (July 6, 1967, to January 15, 1970) ended, a narrative is being spread that Nigeria committed genocide during the war by carrying out a naval blockade of the Bight of Biafra/Bonny, thereby, preventing food and supplies from getting into Biafra to feed the civilian population who suffered from massive starvation, kwashiorkor and death. Those who espoused this perspective believe that Nigeria committed genocide by intentionally preventing food supplies from getting into Biafra through the sea by blockading the coast. As a result, a considerable number of civilians starved to death in Biafra. Based on this reasoning, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and other leaders of Nigeria during the civil war are accused of committing genocide.
Some publications which hinted of a possible genocide during the civil war included Wole Soyinka’s The Man Died (1971), Chinua Achebe’s There was a Ccountry: A Personal History of Biafra (2012). Some social media content writers and commentators such as Prof. Ujuh Anya have no doubt that Nigeria committed genocide in cahoots with the British. but focused their analysis of the issue exclusively on the role Nigeria played without examining the role Biafra played in precipitating some of the consequences of the blockade. Obinna Chukwunenye Nweke explored the role social media played in generating the debate on genocide during the Nigerian civil war in his study Hunger as a Weapon of War: Biafra, Social Media and the Politics of Famine Remembrance (2023, March 1). Maureen Eke in an ongoing research study Biafran Genocide: War Trauma, and Genocide of Indigenous People (n.d.), examines the violence perpetrated by Nigeria against the Igbo people during and after the Nigerian civil war. Morgan Ogbonna and Charles Akpuh attempted to verify the genocide question in their publication titled The Nigerian Civil War and the Question of Genocide (2025).
The Purpose of This Essay
Thus, the purpose of this essay is to examine whether the naval blockade instituted by Nigeria during the civil war resulted in genocide, and if so, determine the roles Nigerian and Biafran leadership played in contributing to the effect. To accomplish the goal, it is argued here that it is simplistic and propagandistic to blame only one side and not the other in a conventional war involving Nigeria and Biafra without analyzing the events which occurred as the war dragged on. It is further argued that if ‘genocide’ took place because of a naval blockade during the civil war, Biafran authorities were as equally responsible as Nigerian authorities in prolonging the war, thereby increasing starvation of the civilian population. To enhance the understanding of the subject matter, it is essential to define and explain three important theories and concepts. They are genocide, just war doctrine, and conventional and unconventional warfare. Again, it should be noted that this study is focused on the question of whether genocide took place as a result of the naval blockade during the Nigerian – Biafran War.
What is Genocide?
The Genocide Convention of 1948 defines geocide as “specific acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.” These acts include “killing members of such a group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group,” (UN Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.). It is based on this UN definition that some Nigerians concluded that Nigeria committed genocide against Igbos. However, to draw a conclusion that the naval blockade of the coast resulted in Nigeria committing genocide, it is necessary to examine the moral and ethical justifications for the actions that precipitated it. Thus, just war theory is probably the best tool in determining the justification and conduct in fighting a war.
Just War Doctrine
The just war doctrine provides a moral and legal framework for evaluating whether war is justifiable and how it should be conducted. This doctrine is applied through three concepts. The first is jus ad bellum which determines the justification for fighting a war. The second is Jus in bello which determines whether a war is conducted ethically. The third is jus post bellum which deals with the treatment of the vanquished after a war.
Under Jus ad bellum concept, the justification for fighting a war includes factors such as the need to stop aggression, to correct wrong, the authority to declare war, the reason of state to protect vital interests, and the hope of success in fighting a war. Thus, to fight, it is necessary to pay attention to these factors in order to determine whether it is justifiable to do so. In terms of justification for fighting the Nigerian – Biafran War, the question is whether it was justified for Nigeria and Biafra to fight the civil war. The Nigerian government justified the war as necessary to ensure national unity and the territorial integrity of the state. On the other hand, the Biafran government justified the need to fight to achieve self-determination and ensure the protection of lives since the Igbo people faced danger in Nigeria following the massacre of thousands of them in Northern Nigeria.
In jus in bello, factors such as the conduct of warfare as determined by whether it is a limited or total war, issues of proportionality and discriminate means are considered. Proportionality requires that the casualties and other evils of war suffered by both sides should not outweigh the good achieved by war (Johnson, pp. 101-110, 123). Discriminate means deals with the treatment of noncombatants. This requires that civilians should not be intentionally targeted during war. As a result, civilian casualties can only be tolerated as collateral damage following an attack on a legitimate target. Proportionality also weighs in evaluating the tactics and weapons being used in fighting a war. Thus, the issue of the justifiability of the Nigerian naval blockade to prevent food and supplies from getting into Biafra falls under the concept of jus in bello. Likewise, the starvation and death of civilians following the naval blockade falls under the concept of discriminate means. In other words, should Nigeria and or Biafra bear responsibility for the actions that followed the naval blockade?
Under jus post bellum, factors such as the treatment of the vanquished, peace and reconciliation are considered. Thus, the treatment of prisoners of war, the treatment of the civilian population, and the effort to resettle and rehabilitate the population are taken into consideration in determining the justifiability of conduct following the end of war.
Thus, both the concept of genocide and the doctrine of just war can be applied to the Nigerian civil war to determine whether both Nigeria and Biafra adhered to ethical and legal principles in fighting the civil war (Ogbonna and Akpuh, 2025).
Thus, to determine the justifiability of the naval blockade and whether genocide took place or not and if so, which side is most likely to be held liable, it is necessary to examine the conduct of the war. Why is it necessary to examine the roles played by both the Nigerian and Biafran authorities in prosecuting the war? The reason is that it takes two sides to fight a war. Moreover, both sides contributed to the events which took place before and during the war, resulting in the deployment of naval blockade by Nigeria.
The Difference Between Conventional and Unconventional Warfare
To further determine the justifiability of fighting a war, it is necessary to know the difference between a conventional military force and an unconventional military force. A conventional military force is a regular standing army which uses direct state-to-state and or force-to-force battle against its opponent. A conventional force is always state sponsored; hence, its fighters wear uniforms to show that it is a regular military organization that relies on standardized military weaponry and follows stipulated rules of war. It is answerable to a recognizable or legitimate political authority and has a chain of command structure. The primary purpose of a conventional warfare is to destroy the enemy’s or opponent’s ability to fight by overwhelming it with a superior force (Fabian, 2021, April 5). On the other hand, an unconventional military force is a non-traditional military group or organization that uses indirect means, including guerrilla tactics, subversion, covert operations, insurgency, assassinations, special operations, diversion and asymmetrical warfare (Fowler, 2019, November 4).
The members of a conventional force must always wear uniforms to identify themselves as members of a regular force while members of a non-conventional force do not necessarily have to wear a unform. A conventional force cannot mix or hide with the civilian population during war while an unconventional force often mixes with the civilian population to confuse the opponent. However, increasingly, in the modern era, some unconventional forces have metamorphosed into regular forces by wearing uniforms and fighting as regular forces. The Hezbollah military organization in Lebanon is a good example of a non-conventional force that is transitioning into a conventional force. Having identified some pertinent theories and concepts dealing with war, it is now appropriate to systematically examine whether Nigeria committed genocide or not.
The Events, Circumstances and Actions Taken By Nigeria and Biafra that Impacted the Nigerian Civil War
Both Nigerian and Biafran authorities adopted policies and took actions that instigated armed confrontation resulting in the deployment of a naval blockade.
First, when a political disagreement remains unresolved, the parties in conflict prepare for war to resolve the matter by force. To do so, both sides generally develop strategies and tactics necessary to overwhelm the other side. Therefore, as Nigeria and Biafra prepared to fight, the political and military leadership of both sides developed strategies and military tactics necessary to sustain the war and defeat the opponent. Consequently, Nigeria had its plans to fight and defeat Biafra, with the hope of forcing it to reintegrate with Nigeria and Biafra had its plans to defeat Nigeria and gain independence or separate from Nigeria as a sovereign state.
Perhaps, to counter the creation of 12 states by Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon on May 27, 1967, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu declared secession of the Eastern Region as the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967, and insisted on ensuring its self-determination. The differences in perception by the two leaders and their associates led to the Nigerian Civil war. Thus, the Nigerian – Biafran War was declared by the legitimate political authorities of Nigeria and Biafra since the leaders made pronouncements to that effect. Nigeria insisted on reunifying the country and ensuring its territorial integrity and Biafra insisted on gaining self-determination. Thus, under the just war doctrine, the Nigerian and Biafran authorities bore responsibility for declaring the war and leading the war effort.
Second, part of the strategies and tactics utilized by both sides included using financial and economic means to weaken the military capability of the other side. Based on the strategies and tactics it developed to achieved self-determination, the Eastern Nigerian government, which later became the Republic of Biafra, was the first to deploy financial and economic weapons against Nigeria prior to the outbreak of hostilities. How? As the disagreement between the Nigerian government and the Eastern Nigerian government deepened over the terms of the Aburi Conference, the governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Ojukwu rejected Decree #8 that the federal side enacted to discourage secession and ordered in March 1967 that federal revenues collected in the region, especially oil royalties from Shell BP and other oil companies should not be remitted to the Federal Government but be deposited in the Eastern Nigerian treasury (Akinbode, 2025, May 30). This was followed by massive civilian demonstrations in Port Harcourt to prevent Nigerian oil tankers from loading crude oil in Brass and Bonny. Hence, Nigerian ships which came to load crude oil were forced to return to Lagos without crude oil from the Eastern Region. Thus, the Eastern Nigerian leadership intended to shipwreck Nigeria’s economy which depended on oil resource.
The seizure of federal revenues by the Eastern Nigerian Government laid the motivation for Nigeria to institute a naval blockade to prevent the Republic of Biafra from gaining access to the sea. It also compelled Nigeria to establish a marine military division to quickly recapture the Niger Delta/South-South region and gain control of the oil wealth. As a result, the 3rd Marine Commando Division was established to facilitate the capture of the oil region and deprive Biafra of the ability to control the oil wealth as well as gain access to the sea. This Nigerian tactic was proportionate to the Biafran seizure of federal revenues and the prevention of crude oil shipment by federal ships.
Third, having realized that Nigeria had instituted a naval blockade against its access to the sea, the Biafran leadership had ample opportunity to develop countermeasures to neutralize or negate the effect and ensure the availability of food supplies to its population. The fact that Biafran authorities failed to develop a counterplan to the blockade meant that they rushed the declaration of Biafran secession without sufficient preparation for the consequences. In other words, it was inappropriate for Biafra to fight a conventional war without making adequate preparation to get supplies and food. Thus, Nigeria could not be blamed for the Biafran failure to develop countermeasures to get food supplies for its population. At least, it would have established a marine force to counter the naval blockade.
Fourth, the Biafran inability to develop alternative plans to get food supplies meant that it violated the jus ad bellum concept of just war by rushing to declare secession without making sufficient preparation to fight the war and sustain its population through the production of food. Nigeria cannot be blamed for the Biafran declaration of secession at the time it did without planning to obtain supplies and food for its civilian population.
Fifth, Biafra contributed to the massive starvation of civilians in the sense that it opted to fight the war conventionally. This meant that it fought Nigeria directly by engaging in face to face or toe to toe military action. By adopting a conventional mode of fighting, Biafra established itself as a state that was capable of not only defending its territorial integrity but also taking care of its citizens. In other words, Biafra took responsibility for taking care of its citizens since it decided to fight the war conventionally. It is meaningless to blame Nigeria when Biafra adopted conventional warfare, thereby assuring its citizens and the world that it could protect its territory and provide for the people.
Thus, Nigeria would have been held totally liable if Biafra had fought the war unconventionally. Why? When a military force adopts an unconventional method of fighting, it cannot be held legally responsible for the feeding of an entire population since it operates informally as a non-state actor. For instance, Boko Haram cannot be held responsible for taking care of the residents/citizens of Borno State because it is an unconventional force. On the other hand, Nigeria is totally responsible for all the citizens in Borno State because Nigeria operates as a state and Boko Haram operates as a non-state. Biafra operated as a state, thereby holding itself accountable to the security of its citizens. Consequently, it cannot argue that Nigeria mounted naval blockade to prevent it from obtaining food supplies through Nigerian territory while fighting and killing Nigerian troops in the war to achieved self-determination.
Of course, this does not mean that the leaders of an unconventional force cannot be held responsible for committing crimes against humanity and war crimes if they violate just war principles and the Geneva Convention. In fact, many political and military commanders of non-state armed groups have been arrested and prosecuted for war crimes for brutalizing and killing civilians by the International Criminal Court (ICC). For instance, former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic was found guilty of genocide for the murder of more than 7500 Muslim men and boys in the 1992 -1995 Bosnian War (“Radovan Karadzic: Former Bosnian Serb leader,” (2016, March 24). Other personalities who were caught, tried and found guilty of committing genocide and other war crimes in the Yugoslavian conflicts included military commander Ratko Mladic, Bosnian Serb general Radislav Krstic, a Bosnian Serb doctor Milan Kovacevic, and so forth (PBS Frontline, (n.d.).
In Africa, some political and military leaders of non-state armed groups who have been convicted of war crimes included Commander Dominic Ongwen of the Sinia Brigade of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Bosco Ntaganda, former leader of Union of Congolese Patriots of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) who was convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of 18 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, former Liberian President Charles Taylor was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Union of Congolese Patriots who was convicted of war crimes and the recruitment of children into his armed group. Other Africans who have been convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity included Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb), Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Alfred Yekatom, German Katanga, former President of Sudan, Omar al Bashire. These are only a few of the number of Africans who led armed groups and were charged for war crimes and prosecuted by the ICC. However, in the case of the Nigerian civil war, it was the responsibility of the Biafran state to provide food for its citizens while fighting a conventional war against Nigeria and vice versa.
Sixth, since both Nigeria and Biafra fought the war conventionally, there is no doubt that both sides developed military strategies and tactics to defeat or overwhelm the other, as indicated earlier. For Nigeria, a naval blockade was one of the tactics deployed to force Biafra to capitulate so that the war does not drag on. This is understandable since no country would like to fight an endless war. Hence, countries which are fighting a war deploy tactics that might contribute to defeating the opponent to end the war quickly and reduce the cost and suffering. As a result, in almost every conventional war, various forms of economic tactics are deployed, including naval blockades and economic sanctions. Therefore, it was not unusual for Nigeria to mount naval blockade as a tactic to facilitate quick victory by forcing Biafra to surrender or sue for negotiation to end the conflict. Nigerian military rulers rationalized that economic and food hardship would compel Biafran military authorities to call an end to the war but that did not take place. The mass starvation did not persuade Biafran authorities to call for an end to the war, instead, they continued to fight, thereby, exposing its citizens to hunger and death.
There are historical instances to cite to show how states use economic and financial resources to force their opponents to give up or negotiate an end to a conflict. The United States has mounted economic sanctions against Cuba since October 19, 1960, during President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration to force it to change its political system. Cuba responded by refusing to give in to the sanctions by developing countermeasures to overcome the sanction. By refusing to comply with U.S. demands, Cuba was and continues to be totally responsible for ensuring that its citizens survive the sanctions and not the US. Likewise, North Korea has suffered from global economic sanctions for over seventy years. First, the US mounted total sanctions against the country in 1950. The United Nations joined the US to initiate comprehensive sanctions against North Korea in 2006 (Davenport, January 2022). By refusing to comply with the demand to liberalize its governmental system and stop its nuclear bomb program, it is solely responsible for maintaining its territorial integrity and sustaining its citizens’ wellbeing. It cannot blame the world for the suffering of its citizens since it does not want to comply with the demands of the world.
Since Biafra refused to capitulate despite the hunger that severely affected the civilian population as food supplies dwindled, Nigeria cannot be blamed for the Biafran continuation of the war. Biafran leaders knew that mass starvation was taking place, yet they continued to insist on fighting the war. Under the just war doctrine, if the political authority of a state at war continues to insist on fighting while its civilian population is suffering massively from hunger and dying in the process, the leadership of that state could be held responsible for starving its own population.
Seventh, to avoid being held responsible for causing deaths of thousands or millions of people due to starvation, it is always the case that military commanders of conventional forces often surrender when they realize that they are running out of weapons, equipment and food. For instance, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union during the 2nd World War in 1941, and Soviet commanders at the war front realized that they could not continue to fight effectively since the Germans had blocked their means of getting reinforcement and supplies, they surrendered to save the lives of their soldiers. Hence, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers surrendered to the German forces. For instance, in the Bialystok – Minsk front in July 1941, hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were encircled by German forces and they surrendered. In Smolensk front, German encirclement led to the surrendering of thousands of Soviet troops. In Kiev in September 1941, about 600,000 Soviet troops either surrendered or were killed. On the Vyazma – Bransk front in October 1941, 600,000 Soviet troops surrendered to the German forces (Royde-Smith, 2026, June 15).
When the tide of war changed as the German forces advanced to capture Moscow and Stalingrad (St. Petersburg), they fought very hard but could not capture Moscow and retreated. In Stalingrad, about 300,000 German troops of the Sixth Army were encircled and destroyed. About 91,000 German troops surrendered in February 1943, including 22 generals. It should be noted that even German Field Marshal Frederich Wilhem Ernst Paulus surrendered on January 31, 1943, in Stalingrad when he realized that German forces had been surrounded and they lacked food and resources to continue fighting. He ordered his generals to stop fighting even though Adolf Hitler had commanded him to continue fighting. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union had 3 million German troops as prisoners of war (Hanson, 2020. It should also be noted that in the First Persian Gulf War (1991- 1992), when President Saddam Hussien realized the overwhelming nature of the international force that was mobilized against its occupation of Kuwait, he ordered Iraqi troops to withdraw. Thousands of Iraqi troops surrendered in realization that they could not overcome the international force led by the United States (McDonald, 1999). Therefore, Biafran authorities would have called for a negotiated end to the conflict and save lives when they realized that the Nigerian naval blockade was causing massive hunger among civilians, but they failed to do so.
Eighth, Isaac Adaka Boro, Samuel Owonaro, Nottingham Dick, and their colleagues declared the Niger Delta Republic (NDR) on February 23, 1966. The declaration of secession was a declaration of war against Nigeria. Hence, Nigeria reacted by sending troops and Mobile Police Force to the Niger Delta to stop the secession. Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of the Eastern Region dispatched Nigerian troops on behalf of the Federal Government to squash the secession. Isaac Boro and members of the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) used unconventional war strategy to fight. However, as the leader of the NDVS, he knew that he did not have the military capability to defeat Nigeria and he did not want the civilian population to suffer for the actions of the NDVS. As a result, through persuasion of Ijaw leaders, he surrendered and ended the conflict after twelve days. Thus, Isaac Boro and his colleagues adhered to the concept of proportionality and discriminate means of the fust war doctrine by surrendering and bearing responsibility for declaring the secession of the Niger Delta. He and his colleagues were sentenced to death for committing treason but was pardoned by Gen. Yakubu Gowon.
A little more than a year after sending Nigerian troops to squash Boro’s secession, Lt. Col. Ojukwu too declared secession on May 30, 1967. Thus, his declaration of secession amounted to a declaration of war against Nigeria, just as Isaac Adaka Boro did. However, his actions resulted in a bloody civil war that claimed about 1 to 2 million lives. Unlike Isaac Boro who surrendered to reduce the suffering of the people, Lt. Col. Ojukwu did not surrender or call for the cessation of hostilities as hunger bit deeper in Biafra. He continued to fight on, and the prolongation of the war caused more deaths due to hunger and suffering. It is indeed ironic that Isaac Boro and his colleagues who surrendered were sentenced to death during Maj. Gen. Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi regime for committing treason and Lt. Col. Ojukwu and Biafran leaders who committed treason did not face any trial after so many people lost their lives. Thus, Isaac Boro and Lt. Col. Ojukwu committed the same offence but ended up with different outcomes.
Ninth, it should not be forgotten that before the war erupted, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu stated boldly that “no power in Black Africa could defeat Biafra,” (Nwokeji, 1994, December 26). The statement indicated that Biafran authorities were fully equipped and ready to fight a conventional war. By making such a statement, it meant that the Republic of Biafra had strategized and planned effectively to reinforce its military capability and provide for the wellbeing of Biafran citizens. Since he asserted that no power in Black Africa could defeat Biafra, then why blamed Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, and other Nigerian leaders for the Biafran inability to counter Nigerian naval blockade and stop starvation from taking place?
Tenth, it should be recalled that some Biafran military officers and a civilian diplomat felt that the war was not winnable and suggested the need to negotiate an end to the conflict around August or September 1967. They included Maj. Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Maj. Philip Alale, and Mr. Sam Agbam. The suggestion for a possible negotiation to end the war to stop the suffering of civilians was treated as a treasonable offence and they were hurriedly tried, found guilty and executed on September 27, 1967 (Oliver, 2014, July 13). Lt. Col Victo Banjo met the same fate for suggesting ideas that did not meet the expectations of the Biafran leadership. The fact that these officers knew very early that the war was not winnable and suggested a possible negotiation with Nigeria to end the conflict meant that Biafran authorities did not care much about the suffering of the civilians. As a result, Biafra continued to fight the war as hunger crept in and claimed many lives. The fact that the suggestion for a negotiated end to the war was not heeded by Biafran authorities meant that they were directly responsible for causing starvation by prolonging the war. It is inappropriate to blame Nigeria for genocide when Biafran authorities did not pay much attention to the plight of the civilians who were dying of starvation for lack of food. As stated earlier, it is the responsibility of the political authorities in a war situation to ensure that civilians do not die unnecessarily. Under the just war doctrine, this falls under the principle of proportionality. In this case, Biafran authorities were willing to tolerate a large proportion of civilian deaths from hunger by continuing to fight. Otherwise, the Biafran head of state would have accepted the suggestion made by Maj. Ifeajuna and his colleagues to lay the groundwork for ending the war in late 1967. Likewise, the principle of discriminate means was also violated by the Biafran authorities for disregarding the massive hunger and death that were taking place as the war dragged on.
In terms of strategic thinking, the best time that Biafran authorities would have made effort to end the war was when Biafran forces captured the Mid-West region on August 9, 1967. The occupation of the region strengthened Biafra’s bargaining position. Thus, if the Biafran leadership had listened to Maj. Ifeajuna and his colleagues and quickly laid the framework to end hostilities, fewer deaths would have taken place. Unfortunately, the Biafran leadership missed such a great strategic opportunity. Luckily, a second opportunity to negotiate from the position of strength occurred again when Biafran forces recaptured Owerri on April 25, 1969. Unfortunately, the Biafran leadership did not use the opportunity to negotiate an end to the war. The two failures meant that Biafran authorities wanted to continue fighting even though they knew that the war was not winnable. The failure to seize the opportunity to act to end the conflict could be said to have violated the principles of proportionality and discriminate means.
Eleventh. It should be noted that the Nigeria Military Government agreed to reduce the impact of the naval blockade by negotiating with international humanitarian organizations to open daily air and road corridors to allow food supplies into Biafra. The humanitarian organizations which negotiated with Nigeria included the Joint Church Aid (JCA), led by the Council of Churches and Caritas Internationalis, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Concern Worldwide, and other national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which negotiated for road corridors and daily mercy flights to drop food but the Biafran leader and some Biafran miliary commanders rejected the offer, fearing that such corridors would have enabled the Nigerian military to penetrate Biafran defenses and threaten the Biafran state. The Biafran leadership raised objection to the idea of road corridors and daily mercy flights on the ground that the food and medicine could be poisoned by the Nigerian military. The leadership also opposed the suggestion for daily flights on the ground that such arrangement could have provided opportunity for Nigeria to bombard Biafran positions (Bello, 2021, June 21). Instead, Biafran authorities preferred the risky night flights that brought relief materials from Sao Tome and other places. Some analysts believed that Biafran authorities objected to the road corridors and daily mercy flights because the two options would have made it difficult for Biafra to clandestinely obtain arms to fight the war. On the other hand, Nigeria objected to the night flights on the ground that such flights would have allowed Biafra to import arms. It should be noted that when a Swedish Red Cross plane was shot down or crashed in 1969, Nigerian authorities found out that the plane was piloted by mercenaries and criticized the humanitarian organizations for allowing mercenaries to fly in arms (Adekilekun, 2026, January 12). Nigeria blamed the clandestine flights for prolonging the war and increasing suffering and death.
Twelfth, it should be recalled that the situation became unbearable in Biafra to the extent that Chief/Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe too was terrified of the horror that was befalling civilians as starvation, kwashiorkor, and death afflicted the population while the war dragged on. Consequently, while he was a member of a Biafran diplomatic peace team to the Organization of African Union (OAU0 in Algeria in August 1969, he left the team and flew to Europe and ended in London to encourage unification of Nigeria. He met Liberian President William Tubman who arranged a meeting with Gen. Gowon. President Tubman assisted greatly in setting up the process for negotiating an end to the conflict (Duruiheoma, 2024, March 29). In fact, Dr. Zik visited most of the states’ capitals in Nigeria and spoke about ending the war and establishing conditions for reconciliation. The fact that Dr. Azikiwe opposed continuing the war clearly showed that the Biafran authorities were liable for bearing responsibility for causing mass starvation. Otherwise, they would have done what many political leaders and military commanders have done, including Isaac Boro, to surrender or negotiate an end to the conflict.
It should be noted that Col. Ojukwu even put Dr. Azikiwe under house arrest in Portugal after inviting him there. Two security men kept watching every move or action that Dr. Zik took. Dr. Azikiwe managed to slip away and flew to London. Former Senator Jim Nwobodo narrated the story:
Ojukwu had invited Zik to a meeting in Portugal and when he arrived, he detailed two security operatives around Zik. Anywhere Zik went, those men were around him, giving information about where he went, what he did and said. Zik told me he didn’t want to do that but because he didn’t know why Ojukwu should ask him to come overseas and keep two security men around him. He wasn’t a thief, he wasn’t a criminal. Why should he do that? (Duruiheoma, 2024, March 29).
Dr. Azikiwe was even accused of being a saboteur for attempting to bring an end to the conflict. It got to a point where Onisha people were accused of betraying the Republic of Biafra because both Maj. Ifeajuna and Dr. Zik the sons of Onisha. This created tension between Onitsha people and other Biafrans.
Thirteenth, did Nigeria intend to destroy, in whole or in part the Igbos? The answer is no, as far as the naval blockade is concerned. The reason is that Nigeria made sure that all civilians in the recaptured areas were duly fed and provided accommodations. Thus, if Nigeria had failed to provide food and protective accommodation to those civilians and prisoners of war, then the argument that Nigeria engaged in genocide would have been proven beyond doubt, in terms of the naval blockade. The Northern and Asaba massacres of Igbos had nothing to do with the naval blockade, which is the focus of this paper.
Fourteenth, based on the points noted above, it was obvious that Nigeria did not intend to exterminate the Igbo people by instituting a naval blockade. It wanted to end the war very quickly by compelling Biafran authorities to give up the secession, thereby minimizing the number of civilian casualties. Unfortunately, the starvation and death of civilians were an unintended consequence of the delay in bringing the war to an end (Ohadike, 1994). Nigeria demonstrated that it did not want to exterminate the Igbos by first initiating a police action to persuade Biafran authorities to stop the secession. The Biafran resistance to the police action led to a full-blown war.
Fifteen, it was widely reported that a sizable proportion of food supplies that got into Biafra were allegedly diverted to feed the military and not sufficiently distributed to the civilian population to mitigate starvation. The allegation was magnified when Biafra surrendered on January 15, 1970, and many of the soldiers, especially the officers, looked well-fed while the civilian population looked emaciated and sick.
Summary and Conclusion.
First, it was the Eastern Nigerian authorities which initiated a financial and economic sanction against Nigeria when federal revenues in the Eastern Region were seized and deposited in the region’s treasury instead of being sent to the federal treasury. Second, Nigeria responded by instituting a naval blockade as a countermeasure to weaken Biafran ability to sustain its military capability. The blockade inadvertently also resulted in stopping food supplies to Biafra through the sea. Third, Nigeria hoped to cripple the Biafran ability to continue fighting by instituting the blockade so that Biafra would sue for a negotiated end to the conflict. Contrary to the Nigerian expectation, Biafra insisted on fighting even though the food situation was increasingly unbearable as millions of civilians starved and many died. Fourth, Biafran authorities failed to call for an end to the conflict even though they knew that Biafra could not win the war. The failure to initiate a plan to end the conflict tended to violate both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello concepts of the just war doctrine because the benefit of continuing to fight was outweighed by the massive suffering that took place due to starvation. Fifth, some Biafran officers who realized that the war was not winnable called for a negotiated settlement of the conflict to stop mass starvation but were arrested, hurriedly tried for treason and executed for supposedly betraying the Biafran cause. The execution of those officers meant that Biafran authorities did not pay sufficient attention to the starvation that was afflicting the civilian population. The failure to pay attention to mass starvation was a violation of the principle of jus in bello. Sixth, when Chief/Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe changed his perspectives about Biafra and decided to lay the groundwork for a negotiated end to the war, Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu and some Biafran officials viewed him as a traitor. Hence, he was put under surveillance and he managed to escape to Europe. Thus, the Biafran opposition to Dr. Azikiwe’s peace efforts showed a violation of the just war doctrine and encouraged the perpetuation of mass starvation and death. It was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, working through Liberian President Wiliam Tubman who helped to lay the groundwork for a negotiated end to the Nigerian – Biafran war and not the leadership of Biafra. Seventh, perhaps, unintended, it was the Biafran leadership which encouraged mass starvation and death of hundreds of thousands of civilians by refusing to acknowledge that the war was not winnable yet continued to fight thereby prolonging the suffering in Biafra.
In conclusion, Nigeria did not show or demonstrate any effort to exterminate the Igbos or engage in genocide through naval blockade. It first initiated a police action to persuade Biafran authorities from seceding. The Biafran resistance to the police action led to a full-blown war. As the war progressed, Nigerian authorities even agreed to allow humanitarian organizations to carry out daily mercy flights to supply foods to Biafra. Nigeria also agreed to open road corridors to allow food supplies, but the Biafran leadership rejected the plans and opted to go with clandestine night flights which included the supply of weapons as well as food. Consequently, Biafran authorities seemed to bear a greater responsibility in creating an environment which prolonged the war, thereby contributing to severe starvation and deaths of many civilians.
References
Adekilekun, A. (2026, January 12). Biafra airlift shock: The night flights that changed war, faith, and survival. Historical Nigeria. The Night Flights That Changed War, Faith, and Survival.
Ayorinde, A. (2025, May 30). Why Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967.Historyville. Why Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967 – HistoryVille.
Bello, T. (2021, June 21). Ojukwu’s Biafra: Relief corridor, arms smuggling, and broken diplomacy in the Nigerian civil war. War & Society: Vol 40, No 3. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07292473.2021.1942625.
Davenport, K (2022, January). U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-north-korea.
Duruiheoma, D. (2024, March 29). How Zik ended Biafra war, by Nwobodo. The nation. https://thenationonlineng.net/how-zik-ended-biafra-war-by-nwobodo/#google_vignette.
Eke, M. (n.d.). Biafran genocide: War, trauma, and genocide of indigenous people. Oceanic Conference on International Studies. Biafran Genocide: War, Trauma, and Genocide of Indigenous People – 2025 OCIS.
Fabian, S., 2021, April 5). Irregular versus conventional warfare: A dichotomous misconception. modern war.
Fowler, M. (2019, November 4). The rise of the present unconventional character of warfare. The Strategy Bridge.
D. C. Ohadike, (1994). Anioma; A Social history of the western Igbo people” Athens: Ohio University Press.
Hanson, V. D. (2020). The Second World Wars: How the first global conflict was fought and won. New York: Basic Books.
Johnson, J. T. (2016). Just war tradition and the restraint of war, Princeton University Press.
Lee, Y. S. (2018). International isolation and regional inequality: Evidence from sanctions on North Korea. Journal of Urban Economics, 103, pp. 34 – 51.
McDonald, J. A. (1999). After Desert Storm: The United States Army and the reconstruction of Kuwait. Department of the Army. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Nweke, O. C. (2023, March 1). Hunger as a weapon of war: Biafra, social media and the politics of famine remembrance. Taylor & Francis. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2023.2182283#abstract
Nwokeji, G. U. (1994, December 26). The necessity of the Biafran war. Google Group. https://groups.google.com/g/usaafricadialogue/c/9b4QZDOaFhM.
Ogbonna, M. and Akpuh, C. (2025). The Nigerian civil war and the question of genocide. Nigerian Journal of Arts and Humanities, Vol. 5 No 2.
Oliver, B. (2014, July 13). Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Commonwealth Games gold to facing a firing squad. The Guardian.
PBS Frontline. (n.d.). Indicting the leaders. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/indicted.html.
Radovan Karadzic: Former Bosnian Serb leader. (2016, March 24). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19960285.
Royde-Smith, J. (2026, June 15). Later actions in Operation Barbarossa. Britannica. Operation Barbarossa – Nazi Invasion, Soviet Defenses, Consequences | Britannica.
The U.S. Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Training Manual. (2011, March 3). U.S. Army.
United Nations Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. (n.d.). Definition of genocide and related crimes. https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/definition.
torulaghareportsdotcom 