A Stalemate in the Russia -Ukraine War is Tantamount to Russian Victory and Ukrainian Defeat

Priye S. Torulagha

Although the Israel -Hamas war has taken the global focus away from the Russia – Ukraine war, the war continues in a grinding manner, like during the First World War.  Hence, the war is proceeding in a manner reminiscent of a dramatic play in a theater where the play is gradually winding down as it gets closer to the end and the dramatis personae begin to act reflectively to dramatize the implications of the story.  Thus, the major participants in the war are winding down their intentions, expectations, and positions because the outcome seems to go in an unexpected direction with an advantage for Russia.  However, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the commander in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, characterized the situation as a stalemate (Slisco, 2023, December 4).    Assuming that the war is stalemated, as Gen. Zaluzhnyi indicates, and not a military victory for Russia per se, it means that the Ukrainians were not able to push Russian forces out of the country in their counteroffensive and the Russian forces seemed to have dug-in their positions inside Ukraine. The development implies a strategic military victory for Russia and a defeat for Ukraine. Why?

Due to the stalemated nature of the conflict, meaning that Ukraine was not able to achieve its primary goal of driving out Russian forces from its territory during the counteroffensive in the summer months of 2023, The failure seems to put a dent on  the enthusiasm of the country’s backers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Poland, and so forth, as they increasingly assume that the war is a lost effort.  This perception greatly influences American and European citizens who are increasingly opposed to sending more public funds to support a lost cause. As a result, in the US., some members of the Republican Party are becoming resistant to continue funding the war and are putting inhibitions to make it difficult for the US Congress to pass a legislation needed to approve funding of Ukraine.  To lessen opposition to funding Ukraine, President Joe Biden included money for securing the US southern border as part of a strategy to gain Republican support to pass a bill to fund Ukraine and Israel at the same time. President Biden hopes that by allocating funding for securing the southern border to stop illegal immigration, the Republicans will approve funding for Ukraine as well as Israel (Kanno-Youngs, 2023, December 8).  Despite the president’s effort, Senate Republicans still refused to back down on their demands. This means that Ukraine is no longer at the core of US NATO policy but Israel over the war in Gaza. Thus, the Israel -Hamas war is now at the center of gravity for the US to stand firm with Israel while it tries to liquidate Hamas which launched the October 7, 2023, raid that killed 1,200 people, thereby necessitating Israel’s counterattack.

A Stalemate is a Victory for Russia

It is argued here that a stalemate in the war is a victory for Russia and a defeat for Ukrainian.  Why? The view that a stalemate is a victory for Russia is not an exaggeration, as Con Coughlin wrote of the situation, “With the Ukraine conflict languishing in stalemate, the possibility that Russian president Vladimir Putin might yet emerge victorious from his ill-judged invasion cannot be ignored, with all the implications such as outcome would have for Europe’s security (Putin is close to victory. Europe should be terrified. (2023, December 7).

 First, a stalemate implies that Russia is winning the war because it still occupies a third of Ukrainian territory and tactically divides the country into two.  The reason is that Ukraine has not been able to drive Russian forces out of its territory, meaning that its military offensive did not yield the expected result.  Therefore, as far as Russian forces remain in Ukraine, the country cannot exercise sovereignty over its territory. If Ukrainian forces do not push the Russian forces out, then the country is defeated.

Second, one of the reasons Russia gave for invading Ukraine was to integrate the Russian-speaking regions in the East with Russia since the Ukrainians had allegedly discriminated and violated their human rights in the country.  Therefore, if the war remains stalemated, it means that Russia has achieved the goal of carving out the ethnic Russian regions, including Crimea from Ukraine since Ukrainian forces have not been able to drive the Russian forces out of the country to restore the territorial integrity of the country.

Third, If the war remains stalemated, it means that Ukraine cannot return to normalcy since the Russian presence in the country implies that Ukraine cannot begin reconstruction and enable the displaced Ukrainians to return and join the effort to reconstruct and normalize their existence.  A stalemate simply means that the war continues, regardless of the pace of the conflict.  This further means that Russia can launch missile or rocket attacks against any Ukrainian target anytime since hostilities remain.  Such a situation further means that if Ukraine tries to create any employment situation or carry out a major repair of the infrastructure, Russia can put a stop to such an effort anytime to compel the country to limp along without focus, as far as the stalemate remains.

Fourth, a stalemate means that Russia is winning the war because there are no Ukrainian forces in Russian territory apart from occasional sending of drones and missiles to hit some targets in the country.  Thus, most Russians do not feel the impact of the war as Ukrainians do.  The reason is that Russians continue to develop and expand their economy by manufacturing products for the global market to earn national income while Ukraine cannot manufacture and sell because of Russian constant attacks.  Moreover, over 8 million Ukrainians are refugees outside the country and cannot go back while hostilities remain.

Fifth, as the war drags on, many frustrated Ukrainians might blame President Volodymyr Zelensky and his top advisers for failing to analyze the situation critically before plunging head-long to fight a conventional war on the instigation of outside political and military interests, against the strategic interest of Ukraine.  The blame could put undue pressure on President Zelensky to negotiate an end to the war with Russia to avoid further destruction of the country.  Those outside the country who are waiting for the war to end might also get tired of remaining as refugees in other countries and become  antagonistic to Zelensky’s government.  Diana Roy noted:

According to the UN refugee agency, more than thirteen million people, or nearly a third of Ukraine’s prewar population, have been displaced since the invasion. Of that, more than five million are internally displaced, while over eight million are refugees living in neighboring countries (Roy, 2023, June 8).

 Thus, a stalemate is politically unpalatable to Ukraine’s high government officials in a country besieged by war. It could result in a sudden change of leadership if President Zelensky does not handle the situation tactfully. It is also not good for the psychology of the Ukrainian people who increasingly feel despondent.

Sixth, a stalemate is going to affect the level of European support for Ukraine.  The reason is that both government officials and the citizens of NATO countries are getting tired of continuously funding a war that is not likely to end in Ukraine’s victory.  So far, it appears that Western countries have spent about $200 billion to support Ukraine in the war with Russia.  The US alone has spent about $113 billion in support of the country (Drenon, 2023, February 21). Thus, to continue to fund a stalemated war is to continue to exhaust their financial resources and military weaponry.  It is widely reported that many NATO members have nearly exhausted their stockpiles of military weapons for their own national security.  The reason is that most NATO members did not expect the war to last this long since at the beginning of the war they had the impression that Russia would be incapable of sustaining the war for a long duration due to the severe economic sanctions instituted by the US and the European Union (EU) to cripple its economy, thereby prompting it to stop the war. As a result of the oversimplification of Russian capability following the economic sanctions, Western experts and journalists had repeatedly reported that Russia was on the verge of running out of arms.  The first such report was in March 2022, then it was repeated in April 2022, then July and September 2022.  Unknown to Western and Ukrainian experts and intelligence agents, the Russians were able to adopt measures to minimize the negative effects of the economic sanctions imposed on the country.  Apart from beating the sanctions, the Russians also ramped up arms production to offset losses in the battlefield.  As a result, of all the countries that are involved in the Russian – Ukrainian war, it is only Russia that successfully mobilized the country for war by ramping up the production of military weaponry. On the other hand, neither the US nor its European allies mobilized their arms manufacturing industries to ramp up production to meet the war demands of Ukraine.

Seventh, thus, while Russia continues to increase its arms production to meet the demands of the war, Ukraine is unable to produce its own weapons because Russia is constantly on the look out for any Ukrainian effort to produce any weapon to fill its dwindling stockpiles.  The difference in the quantity of arms possessed by both sides forces President Zelensky to travel to the West regularly to beg for arms supplies.  In fact, he visited Washington DC on December 12, 2023, to plead for the passage of a bill that will allow the US to continue funding his country’s war effort which is in a precarious situation.  Basically, the Ukrainians are fighting two wars, one is to campaign vigorously for continuing Western financial and military support and the other is to militarily hold the Russians back so that their forces do not crash for lack of weapons. It is not easy for President Zelensky to travel around Europe and the US to beg for continuing support.

Eighth, the more the war is stalemated, the more Russia is going to produce more weapons with a view of attacking Ukraine constantly, thereby causing more damage to the already devastated infrastructure.  Eventually, Russia might decide to expand its territorial control if it realizes that Ukraine is on the verge of collapsing militarily.  To avoid such a development, it is necessary for the Ukrainian Government to reinforce its military forces while looking for a way to negotiate an end to the war. To avoid a sudden collapsing of the Ukrainian military forces due to lack of weapons, it is necessary for the US and its NATO allies to continue to fund Ukraine while encouraging the country’s leaders to negotiate for a face-saving way out of the imbroglio.

Ninth, a Russian victory in Ukraine increases the concern in Europe that Russia might expand the war with the hope of recreating a Soviet-like empire by reincorporating some Eastern European countries into the Russian federation.  The concern is prompted by the fact that most NATO countries have almost exhausted their military stockpiles.  This means that if Russia were to advance farther west, many European countries would be left unprotected after expending a considerable quantity of their military hardware in Ukraine.  Again, Con Coughlin noted:

The prospect of Russia intensifying the threat it poses to European security in the event of Putin achieving only modest gains in Ukraine has prompted a number of prominent European military experts to question openly NATO’s preparedness for meeting such a challenge. A recent defence conference in Berlin was treated to a doomsday scenario whereby Europe risked suffering the same fate as the Holy Roman Empire under Napoleon, and being “washed away” in a future conflict with Russia because of NATO’s inability to defend Europe’s eastern flank. (2023, December 7).

The concern about European unpreparedness to face a Russian westward movement is being expressed in Germany by some officials. Reuters reported that the German Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces stated that the German military is suffering from shortage of weapons now than before the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.  Eva Hoegl stated “The Bundeswehr has too little of everything, and it has even less since (Russia’s invasion (2023, March 14). This sentiment is also being expressed in other parts of Europe as Russia seems to have a military advantage over Ukraine in the war.

Tenth, as the war reaches a stalemate, thereby informing discerning minds about the possibility of Russia winning the war and Ukraine’s defeat, many Ukrainians are beginning to dodge or avoid the military draft, unlike during the early phase of the war when the level of patriotism was very high, fearful that they would be sent to fight a war with no hope of military victory.  A war with no hope of victory implies that it is fruitless to enlist in the armed forces, except one wish to die for nothing.  Thus, many young Ukrainians are fleeing the country to avoid being drafted. Michael Murphy described the development:

Ukrainian men are trekking through mountains to dodge conscription, according to border officials.

Soldiers armed with Kalashnikov rifles and dressed in white camouflage are regularly intercepting fighting age men attempting to flee Ukraine via its snowy, mountainous border with Romania, a Ukrainian border official told the Washington Post (2023, December 8).

Eleventh, as the impression is being created that Russia is winning the war and Ukraine is not featuring well, its immediate neighbors to the West, including Poland, Germany, and the Baltic states of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and probably Norway are worried that Russia might come after them.  This concern could force them to act independently rather than follow a collective NATO plan to deal with the Russian threat.  An individual effort to shore up their territories could lead to rivalry among neighbors, thereby playing to the strategic advantage of Russia.

Moreover, the threat of Russia’s westward movement after the war with Ukraine could tempt some European Union members to blame the United States for putting them in the predicament, instead of accepting responsibility for pushing Ukraine to stand toe to toe and fight Russia, a military superpower in a conventional war.  Some might begin to lay the groundwork for a European defense system and rely less on NATO which is led by the United States that is thousands of miles away from the European mainland.

Failure to Pay Attention to the Cold War and Russian Concerns about NATO’s Eastward Expansion

Ukraine would not have been caught in this unpleasant situation if its political and military leaders had paid attention to the history of the Cold War and adopted neutrality as a policy to escape being caught in the power struggle between the United States and Russia.  Additionally, if the country’s leaders had systematically analyzed the political developments following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, they would not have exposed their country and citizens to the harrowing war that has devastated the country.  Instead of doing so, they were carried away by emotion and fell prey to the big power play by the United States and the NATO.

Thus, they failed to realize that Russia is a military superpower like the United States and China, with thousands of nuclear warheads that is very difficult to subdue militarily.  Likewise, President Volodymyr Zelensky and his advisers did not seem to pay attention to the fact that Russia had insisted as far back as 1991 during negotiations to reunite East Germany with West Germany that it would not tolerate NATO eastward expansion to its borders.  It seemed that both the Soviet and Western allies agreed in various high-level meetings involving President Mihail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, Soviet Union Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnazde, President George Bush Sr. of the United States,  US Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker,  former CIA Director Robert Gates, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, German Foreign Minister  Hans-Dietrich Gensher, President Francois Mitterrand of France, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of United Kingdom,  British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the German Democratic Republic’s Foreign minister Osker Fischer, and NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner that NATO would not expand eastwards toward Russia (“NATO Expansion:  What Gorbachev Heard,” December 12, 2017).

Even US officials were aware of the danger of expanding NATO towards the Russian border. George Kennan, the US architect of the Western containment policy against communism and Soviet expansion warned about the danger by saying: 

expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking …” (“Noted: George Kennan on NATO Expansion. (n.d.);  Goldgeier, June 1, 1999).

Likewise, William Burns, the former US ambassador to Russia and CIA director, tended to agree with George Kennan by stating, “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite not just Putin” (Cohen, March 27, 2022).  The New York Times felt the possibility of Russian aggressive rection toward NATO expanding eastwards by writing:

After a decade of NATO expansion into the former Communist bloc, a resurgent Russia

Is now vigorously opposing membership for Georgia and Ukraine and pressing those already in the alliance with threats should Poland and the Czech Republic cooperate with the United States on missile defense” (Shanker, September 18, 2008).

The Germans too knew that Russia will not take it kindly as NATO expands eastward. Hence on February 10, 1990, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said, “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity” (“NATO Expansion:  What Gorbachev Heard,” December 12, 2017).  It should be recalled that former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev warned against expanding NATO eastward toward Russia while addressing US Congress in 1997 “You cannot humiliate a people without consequences” (“Gorbachev warns Congress against NATO expansion,” April 16, 1997).

There is no doubt that the Ukrainian leadership was keenly aware of the danger of NATO moving towards the Russian border, yet decided to go along with the idea of aligning with NATO against Russia which shares a border with the country.  The fact that the Ukrainian leadership knew the risk of taking side in a power struggle between global military superpowers is supported by a revelation made by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel indicating that the Minsk Agreement was only a ploy to allow the Ukrainian military to build up and prepare for war against Russia.  She made the revelation while being interviewed by Die Zeit by saying the 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give time to Ukraine. It…used this time to become stronger as can be seen today. The Ukraine of 2014-2015 is not the modern Ukraine.”  (Kuzmarov. 2022, December 19).

The implication being that both the West and the Ukrainian leadership made a conscious choice to prepare for war even before Russia invaded on February 24, 2022.  This further meant that Ukraine adopted war as a strategy to deal with Russia. The Angela Merkel revelation tended to support the Russian view that it had to invade Ukraine since the country had prepared militarily to threaten its territorial integrity and sphere of influence. Thus, the Ukrainian leadership decided to take the Russian bull by its horns and openly aligned with NATO to prepare to fight Russia. To reinforce its position, the leadership enunciated incredulous policy goals which included driving out Russia militarily from its territory, effecting a regime change in Russia and ushering in a democratic system in the country.  This meant that the die was already casted before Russia actually invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.  

Lessons Learned and Inferences Drawn from the Ukrainian Imbroglio

The political and military leadership of small to medium size countries should learn from the untenable Ukrainian situation.  Thus, many lessons and inferences can be drawn from the Ukrainian imbroglio.

First, it is critical for political and military leaders to clearly identify the strategic interests of their states before embarking on a journey that could embroiled them in a conflict. This must be done using the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) model in an objective manner.  The purpose is to make sure that political and military leaders do not embroil their states in unwarranted regional and global political and military conflicts that can devour them.  

Second, it is strategically important to depend less on foreign financial and military assistance in making decisions about war and peace.  The reason is that the more a particular state depends on the financial and military assistance or aid of another, it is going to overrate its military capability and underestimate the military capability of its potential opponents, thereby getting involved in conflict situations it would have completely avoided.  It is obvious that Ukrainian political and military leaders had their military capability inflated based on promises made by the NATO and other European countries.  In other words, if Ukrainian leaders had not put their hope on NATO providing them essential sophisticated military equipment, they would not have decided to confront Russia toe-to-toe in a grinding conventional war, knowing full well that Russia is a military superpower and has the economies of large-scale military technological production and has assorted categories of military weaponry.  In other words, no political or military leader should evaluate his or her country’s military capability to fight a superior military power based on the assumptions or promises of support coming from the outside.

Third, it is strategically significant for any sovereign state to avoid depending on foreign military and financial aid.  Why, it is a common saying that nothing goes for nothing.  Thus, the more a state depends on another state for financial and military support, it is going to dance to the musical tune of the donor  state.  In other words, the country that provides the assistance is definitely going to get something back in return.  Quite often, the receiving country ends up giving back a major facet of its assets or resources or ability to make independent decisions.  Apparently, Ukraine sacrificed its ability to make an independent evaluation of the Russian invasion of the country since it depended on the decisions of its outside supporters.  It is widely reported that both Russia and Ukraine came very close to making a peace deal through the diplomatic effort of Turkey to end the war in March 2022, a month after the Russian invasion but the deal did not go through, perhaps, due to outside influence on the Ukrainian leadership. Joe Walsh reported:

Russian and Ukrainian negotiators are weighing a potential deal that would require Ukraine to be militarily neutral—barring the country from joining NATO or hosting foreign bases—but allow it to seek security guarantees from other countries and pursue EU membership, according to the Financial Times, which cited four unnamed sources.

Ukrainian politician and negotiator David Arakhamia told the newspaper these security guarantees could require countries like the United States to assist Ukraine if it is attacked, an arrangement he compared to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense rule (2022, March 28).

It seemed that the United Kingdom (UK) was opposed to the negotiation between Ukraine and Russia.  Jake Johnson reported about the UK intervention to stop the negotiations:

Johnson’s meeting with cabinet ministers came weeks after the Ukrainian newspaper Ukrayinska Pravda reported that during a visit to Kyiv in April, the British leader urged Zelenskyy to cut off diplomatic talks with Putin, insisting that the Russian president “should be pressured, not negotiated with.”

Peace talks have since been at a standstill as Russian forces ramp up their assault on eastern Ukraine and the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States prepare to arm Ukrainian forces with longer-range rocket systems, heightening fears of a broader war between Russia and NATO (2022, June 7. Borsi Johnson says Ukraine should not accept “bad peace” with Russia. Common Dreams. (2022, June 7).

There is no doubt that if Ukraine had not depended on outside financial and military support, a peace agreement would have been sealed.  Unfortunately, it had to take the position of its outside partners into consideration in negotiating with Russia, thereby complicating the situation for Ukraine’s political and military leadership as Britian opposed the idea.

It should be noted that Nigeria and other members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) almost fell into the Ukrainian trap when they decided to militarily intervene in the Republic of Niger and restore a democratically elected leader who was overthrown in a military coup.  It was apparent that the decision of the leadership of the ECOWAS to intervene was greatly encouraged by France, US, and other Western countries, against the general interests of Africa.  Fortunately, the pressure from West African citizens and interest groups across the African continent forced the ECOWAS leadership to avoid being trapped in a war that would have seriously impacted the West African region negatively.

It should also be noted that the Republic of Georgia too almost got itself entangled in the feud between NATO and Russia.  Luckily for Georgia, the destruction inflicted on Ukraine has enabled many Georgians to realize that the best policy for a country that shares a border with a military superpower is to adopt a policy of neutrality. It should be recalled that Switzerland survived both the 1st and 2nd World wars unscathed because it adopted neutrality.

Fourth, it is always preferable to have seasoned individuals become political and military leaders of any country so that they are not easily influenced by emotions to make costly decisions.  It is also important to have seasoned leaders who can stand their ground and defend the national interest without being compelled to embark on regional and global actions that are capable of seriously hurting their countries and citizens.

Fifth, in particular, African leaders should learn from the Ukrainian situation and stop travelling around the globe in search of foreign financial and military aid and rely more on themselves and their citizens to develop and modernize their countries.  In this regard, they should minimize attending conferences organized by other countries to woo and exploit them.  Likewise, they should be more careful before signing bilateral and multilateral treaties that often end up disadvantaging their countries and citizens.  

Sixth, it is necessary for less militarily powerful countries to avoid signing military cooperation treaties with militarily powerful countries.  The reason is that such treaties render them semiautonomous, even though they are sovereign states.  A treaty involves obligations, hence, as soon as one is signed, the signee must abide by the conditions of the treaty.  Quite often, the most dominant military powers will always have an advantage over the less militarily powerful members of any bilateral or multilateral treaty.  Indeed, Ukraine was not capable of making independent decisions that serve its strategic interest.

Seventh, there is no other option left than for the Ukrainian political and military leadership to consult with its Western partners and then negotiate with Russia to end the war.   A stalemate is not to the strategic advantage of Ukraine.  Ukraine needs an end to the war so that its millions of citizens who are wallowing in refugee camps can return to help rebuild the country.  Ukraine can easily be rebuilt due to the industrious nature of the citizens.  Its agricultural industry will rebound very quickly to continue to become a major supplier of agricultural products in the world.

Eighth, it is a grievous strategic flaw to underrate the military capability of potential military opponents.  It should be noted that the Ukrainian political and military leadership, following Western advice, underrated the military capability of the Russians to fight a grinding war.  As a result, when Russian forces retreated from Kiev and other parts of Ukraine, following the initial invasion, the readjustment of Russian forces was treated as a defeat for Russia and the military capability of Ukraine to fight toe-to-toe with the country was blown out of proportion.  Soltan Barany, like many other experts and intellectuals, characterized the Russian military readjustment of strategy as a failure.  Hence, he identified five major reasons why Russia failed militarily (Barany, 2023, January).Another Western writer too viewed the Russian tactical change of military plan as a sign of military failure and some sort of victory for Ukraine. Eugene Humer, a former intelligence officer wrote:

A year into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine, Russia has suffered a major strategic defeat, Ukraine has achieved a major strategic victory, and the West has demonstrated a combination of resolve, unity, and cohesion that few had expected. This, however, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, is not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

Ukrainians, having tasted victory on the battlefield and united in their desire for justice and revenge, cannot accept a land-for-peace compromise. For Putin, whose war it is primarily, compromise is not an option after the humiliation of the failed campaign in pursuit of his maximalist objectives. (Rumer, 2023, February 17).

   It was the euphoria over the Russian realignment of strategy and the perception in the West that the change in plan was a reflection of Russian military failure that led to the theorization that Ukraine’s military forces would be able to fight a grinding war with Russia until it is exhausted, thereby leading to a regime change and the democratization of Russia.  The euphoria also led the Ukrainian leadership to insist that it will fight until Russian troops are forced out of every inch of Ukrainian territory. The perception that the Russian military is weak probably compelled Ukrainian officials to insist on accomplishing six goals in the war with Russia.  The goals, as identified in an article titled “The Russo-Ukrainian War: It is Time for a Negotiated Settlement to Avoid Military Quagmire and a Possible 3rd World War,” included (1) push Russia out of its territory, (2) possibly defeat and degrade Russian military capability, (3) possibly initiate a regime change so that President Putin is removed from power in order to democratize Russia, (4) ensure severe global economic sanctions against Russia for invading the country, (5) demand compensation for the infrastructural damage and loss of life caused by the Russian invasion, (6) conduct international tribunal to try Russians who violate human rights by committing war crimes, and (7) eventually gain membership in the European Union and NATO (Soldak, 2022, June 5).

It was also the underrating of Russia that led the West and Ukraine to keep informing the world that Russia would soon run out of weapons.  This prediction was made repeatedly in March, April, June, July, and September 2022, as indicated earlier. In fact, some Western experts even predicted that due to poor Russian military performance, President Putin would announce a military victory on May 9, 2022, and pull his forces out of Ukraine to save face.  The Western and Ukrainian predictions were so much against Russia and in favor of Ukraine to the point that Ukraine’s top intelligence official, Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov predicted the possibility of Russia running out of weapons by saying:

“Russia has wasted huge amounts of human resources, armaments and materials. Its economy and production are not able to cover these losses. It’s changed its military chain of command. If Russia’s military fails in its aims this spring, it will be out of military tools (Hjelmagaard, 2023, March 2).The senior military intelligence officer made this prediction in early March 2023 about the possibility of Russia running out of weapons.

Here again, Ukraine fell for the so-called “less than capable Russian military might’ hype.  Unfortunately for Ukraine, by the end of November 2023, it is Russia that was predicted by both Western and Ukrainian experts and officials to collapse militarily that is standing strong and Ukraine is limping along while gasping for breath.  The Western nations now realized that it is their own stockpiles of weapons that are diminishing while Russia continues to build up its weaponry.  A German official acknowledged the fact that Germany is not equipped for an effective fighting force.  Reuters wrote: “The chief of the German army vented his frustration over what he sees as the long-running neglect of military readiness in his country in an unusual public rant a few hours after Russia invaded Ukraine, adding that the army was in bad shape (“German army chief ‘fed up’ with the neglect of country’s military.”

The German concern extends to the entire European continent, as analysts worry. The lack of European military preparedness is described below:

European militaries have now experienced decades of decline. Today, much of Europe’s military hardware is in a shocking state of disrepair. Too many of Europe’s forces aren’t ready to fight. Its fighter jets and helicopters aren’t ready to fly; its ships and submarines aren’t ready to sail; and its vehicles and tanks aren’t ready to roll. Europe lacks the critical capabilities for modern warfare, including so-called enabling capabilities—such as air-refueling to support fighter jets, transport aircraft to move troops to the fight, and the high-end reconnaissance and surveillance drones essential for modern combat. European forces aren’t ready to fight with the equipment they have, and the equipment they have isn’t good enough. (Bergmann, Lamond, and Cicarilli, 2021, June 1).

Ninth, the Russia – Ukraine war turned the Western media into a public relations medium for Ukraine as journalistic objectivity was openly sacrificed in support of Ukraine.  All the major Western news media networks including CNN, FOX, DW, New York Times, BBC, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Reuters, Le Monde, Le Figaro, Diet Zeit, WELT, Telewizja Polska, Fakt, and so on and so forth, became the mouthpieces of Ukraine and NATO. Even some of the experienced Western journalists sacrificed professionalism and became advocates for Ukraine.  Due to the unprofessional behavior of Western journalists in the coverage of the war, Western journalists have lost their respect in the non-Western world.  Increasingly, Western journalists are viewed as public relations agents of their countries and the West.  It is doubtful whether the Western media will be able to regain any atom of journalistic respect in the non-Western world again because of the unprofessional performance of the journalists.

Tenth, the war also highlighted the intellectual weaknesses of Western think-tanks and retired senior military officers.  Many researchers and experts who work for Western think-tanks also behaved like Western journalists and acted as advocates for Ukraine instead of providing objective analysis of the conflict.  They tended to agree with government positions in order to show their patriotism and devotion to the Western point of view.  The same goes for many retired Western senior military officers (four-star, three-star, two-star, and one-star generals) who spoke and wrote as if they were advocates for NATO and Ukraine instead of providing an objective analysis of the war that would have been helpful to Western and Ukrainian political and military leaders.  During the early phase of the war, it was more enlightening to listen to the analytical commentary of retired military officers from India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and those in Latin America than retired Western military officers who tended to speak as if they were obligated to support a particular point of view.  Many of them profoundly underestimated Russian military capability, thereby encouraging the Ukrainian political leadership to sacrifice the country. On the other hand, retired Western military officers like Col. Douglas MacGregor and Maj. William Scott Ritter who provided an objective appraisal of the war were and have been blatantly ignored by both government officials and the Western media because their analyses of the war are not in line with the adopted official position. So far, the analytical predictions of these two retired American officers and a few others seem to reflect the actuality of the situation on the ground in Ukrainian.

Eleventh, the Russia – Ukraine War clearly showed the danger that follows when propaganda is used excessively to an extent whereby decision-makers begin to believe in them instead of listening to the soldiers who are fighting the battles on the ground.  In other words, political and military leaders should always avoid treating propaganda as facts, otherwise, they would end up holding the short end of the stick and fail miserably.

References

Barany, Z. (2023, January). Armies and Autocrats: Why Putin’s military failed. Journal of democracy. Vol. 34, Issue 1, pp. 80 – 94). https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/armies-and-autocrats-why-putins-military-failed/.

Bergmann, M., Lamond, J., and Siena Cicarilli, S. (2021, June 1). The case foe EU defense. American Progress.  https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/)

Coughlin, C. (2022, December 7). Putin is close to victory. Europe should be terrified. The Telegraph. https;//news.yahoo.com/putin-close-victory-europe-terrified-060000644.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAA.

Drenon, B. (2023, February 21). How much money has the US given to Ukraine? BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canda-64656301/

German army chief ‘fed up’ with the neglect of country’s military. (2022, February 24). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-army-chief-fed-up-with-neglect-countrys-military-2022-02-24/.

German military in worse shape than before Russia’s invasion – official. ( 2023, March 14). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-military-worse-shape-than-before-russias-invasion-official-2023-03-14/).

Goldgeier, J. (June 1, 1999). The US decision to enlarge NATO: How, when why and whatnext?BrookingsRetrieved March 19, 2022, fromhttps://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-u-s-decision-to-enlarge-nato-how-when-why-and-what-next/).

Gorbachev warns Congress against NATO expansion. (April 16, 1997). Deseret News. Retrieved March 16, 2022, https://www.deseret.com/1997/4/16/19306892/gorbachev-warns-congress-against-nato-expansion).  

Borsi Johnson says Ukraine should not accept ‘bad peace’ with Russia. (2022, June 7). Common Dreams. https://www.commondreams.org/news/2022/06/07/boris-johnson-says-ukraine-should-not-accept-bad-peace-with-russia.

Hjelmagaard, K.  (2023, March 2). Russia will be out of ‘ military tools’ by spring, Ukraine’s top military spy. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2023/03/02/war-top-ukraine-spy-says-russia-out-of-military-tools/11310628002/.

Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2023, December 8) Biden tied Ukraine aid to border security, and it backfired on him.  The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/07/us/politics/biden-immigration-ukraine.html.

Kuzmarov. J.  (2022, December 19). Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel admits that Minsk peace agreements were part of a scheme for Ukraine to buy time to prepare for war.  Global Research. https://www.globalresearch.ca/former-german-chancellor-merkel-admits-minsk-peace-agreements-part-scheme-ukraine-buy-time-pre

Murphy, M. (2023, December 8). Ukrainian men trekking through mountains to dodge conscription. The Telegraph. https://news.yahoo.com/ukrainian-men-trekking-mountains-dodge-154239237.html.

National Security Archive. (December 17, 2017). “NATO Expansion:  What Gorbachev heard.(December 17, 2017).  Retrieved March 18, 2022, from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbache-heard-western-leaders-early). 

Noted: George Kennan on NATO Expansion. (n.d.). Project on Defense Alternatives. Retrieved March 19, 2022, from  https://comw.org/pda/george-kennan-on-nato-expansion/;  James Goldgeier, June 1, 1999. The US Decision to enlarge NATO: How, when, why and what Next? Brookings.  Retrieved March 19, 2022, from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-u-s-decision-to-enlarge-nato-how-when-why-and-what-next/.

Roy, D.  (2023, June 8). How bad is Ukraine’s humanitarian crisis a year later. Council on Foreign Relations. https//www.cfr.org/in-brief/Ukraine-humanitarian-crisis-refuggees-aid.

Rumer, E.  (2023, February 17). Putin’s war against Ukraine: The end of the beginning. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/17/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-end-of-beginning-pub-89071 ).

Slisco, A. (2023, December 4). Ukraine official accuse Zelensky about lying about the war. Newsweek. Https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-official-accuses-zelensky–lying-1849427).   

Soldak,  (2022, June 5). What is Ukraine’s end goal with its war with Russia: Voices from the Battlefield. Forbes, Retrieved June 25, 2022, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/06/05/what-is-ukraines-end-goal-in-its-war-with-russia-voices-from-the-battlefield/?sh=737badfd10b4.

Sullivan, B. (February 24, 2022).  How NATO’s expansion helped drive Putin to invade Ukraine.  NPR. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://www.npr.org/2022/01/29/1076193616/ukraine-russia-nato-explainer).

Walsh. J. (2022, March 28). Russia – Ukraine peace talks: Russia willing to let Ukraine join EU if it stays out of NATO. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/joewalsh/2022/03/28/russia-ukraine-peace-talks-russia-willing-to-let-ukraine-join-eu-if-it-stays-ou

A Stalemate in the Russia -Ukraine War is Tantamount to Russian Victory and Ukrainian Defeat

Priye S. Torulagha

Although the Israel -Hamas war has taken the global focus away from the Russia – Ukraine war, the war continues in a grinding manner, like during the First World War.  Hence, the war is proceeding in a manner reminiscent of a dramatic play in a theater where the play is gradually winding down as it gets closer to the end and the dramatis personae begin to act reflectively to dramatize the implications of the story.  Thus, the major participants in the war are winding down their intentions, expectations, and positions because the outcome seems to go in an unexpected direction with an advantage for Russia.  However, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the commander in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, characterized the situation as a stalemate (Slisco, 2023, December 4).    Assuming that the war is stalemated, as Gen. Zaluzhnyi indicates, and not a military victory for Russia per se, it means that the Ukrainians were not able to push Russian forces out of the country in their counteroffensive and the Russian forces seemed to have dug-in their positions inside Ukraine. The development implies a strategic military victory for Russia and a defeat for Ukraine. Why?

Due to the stalemated nature of the conflict, meaning that Ukraine was not able to achieve its primary goal of driving out Russian forces from its territory during the counteroffensive in the summer months of 2023, The failure seems to put a dent on  the enthusiasm of the country’s backers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Poland, and so forth, as they increasingly assume that the war is a lost effort.  This perception greatly influences American and European citizens who are increasingly opposed to sending more public funds to support a lost cause. As a result, in the US., some members of the Republican Party are becoming resistant to continue funding the war and are putting inhibitions to make it difficult for the US Congress to pass a legislation needed to approve funding of Ukraine.  To lessen opposition to funding Ukraine, President Joe Biden included money for securing the US southern border as part of a strategy to gain Republican support to pass a bill to fund Ukraine and Israel at the same time. President Biden hopes that by allocating funding for securing the southern border to stop illegal immigration, the Republicans will approve funding for Ukraine as well as Israel (Kanno-Youngs, 2023, December 8).  Despite the president’s effort, Senate Republicans still refused to back down on their demands. This means that Ukraine is no longer at the core of US NATO policy but Israel over the war in Gaza. Thus, the Israel -Hamas war is now at the center of gravity for the US to stand firm with Israel while it tries to liquidate Hamas which launched the October 7, 2023, raid that killed 1,200 people, thereby necessitating Israel’s counterattack.

A Stalemate is a Victory for Russia

It is argued here that a stalemate in the war is a victory for Russia and a defeat for Ukrainian.  Why? The view that a stalemate is a victory for Russia is not an exaggeration, as Con Coughlin wrote of the situation, “With the Ukraine conflict languishing in stalemate, the possibility that Russian president Vladimir Putin might yet emerge victorious from his ill-judged invasion cannot be ignored, with all the implications such as outcome would have for Europe’s security (Putin is close to victory. Europe should be terrified. (2023, December 7).

 First, a stalemate implies that Russia is winning the war because it still occupies a third of Ukrainian territory and tactically divides the country into two.  The reason is that Ukraine has not been able to drive Russian forces out of its territory, meaning that its military offensive did not yield the expected result.  Therefore, as far as Russian forces remain in Ukraine, the country cannot exercise sovereignty over its territory. If Ukrainian forces do not push the Russian forces out, then the country is defeated.

Second, one of the reasons Russia gave for invading Ukraine was to integrate the Russian-speaking regions in the East with Russia since the Ukrainians had allegedly discriminated and violated their human rights in the country.  Therefore, if the war remains stalemated, it means that Russia has achieved the goal of carving out the ethnic Russian regions, including Crimea from Ukraine since Ukrainian forces have not been able to drive the Russian forces out of the country to restore the territorial integrity of the country.

Third, If the war remains stalemated, it means that Ukraine cannot return to normalcy since the Russian presence in the country implies that Ukraine cannot begin reconstruction and enable the displaced Ukrainians to return and join the effort to reconstruct and normalize their existence.  A stalemate simply means that the war continues, regardless of the pace of the conflict.  This further means that Russia can launch missile or rocket attacks against any Ukrainian target anytime since hostilities remain.  Such a situation further means that if Ukraine tries to create any employment situation or carry out a major repair of the infrastructure, Russia can put a stop to such an effort anytime to compel the country to limp along without focus, as far as the stalemate remains.

Fourth, a stalemate means that Russia is winning the war because there are no Ukrainian forces in Russian territory apart from occasional sending of drones and missiles to hit some targets in the country.  Thus, most Russians do not feel the impact of the war as Ukrainians do.  The reason is that Russians continue to develop and expand their economy by manufacturing products for the global market to earn national income while Ukraine cannot manufacture and sell because of Russian constant attacks.  Moreover, over 8 million Ukrainians are refugees outside the country and cannot go back while hostilities remain.

Fifth, as the war drags on, many frustrated Ukrainians might blame President Volodymyr Zelensky and his top advisers for failing to analyze the situation critically before plunging head-long to fight a conventional war on the instigation of outside political and military interests, against the strategic interest of Ukraine.  The blame could put undue pressure on President Zelensky to negotiate an end to the war with Russia to avoid further destruction of the country.  Those outside the country who are waiting for the war to end might also get tired of remaining as refugees in other countries and become  antagonistic to Zelensky’s government.  Diana Roy noted:

According to the UN refugee agency, more than thirteen million people, or nearly a third of Ukraine’s prewar population, have been displaced since the invasion. Of that, more than five million are internally displaced, while over eight million are refugees living in neighboring countries (Roy, 2023, June 8).

 Thus, a stalemate is politically unpalatable to Ukraine’s high government officials in a country besieged by war. It could result in a sudden change of leadership if President Zelensky does not handle the situation tactfully. It is also not good for the psychology of the Ukrainian people who increasingly feel despondent.

Sixth, a stalemate is going to affect the level of European support for Ukraine.  The reason is that both government officials and the citizens of NATO countries are getting tired of continuously funding a war that is not likely to end in Ukraine’s victory.  So far, it appears that Western countries have spent about $200 billion to support Ukraine in the war with Russia.  The US alone has spent about $113 billion in support of the country (Drenon, 2023, February 21). Thus, to continue to fund a stalemated war is to continue to exhaust their financial resources and military weaponry.  It is widely reported that many NATO members have nearly exhausted their stockpiles of military weapons for their own national security.  The reason is that most NATO members did not expect the war to last this long since at the beginning of the war they had the impression that Russia would be incapable of sustaining the war for a long duration due to the severe economic sanctions instituted by the US and the European Union (EU) to cripple its economy, thereby prompting it to stop the war. As a result of the oversimplification of Russian capability following the economic sanctions, Western experts and journalists had repeatedly reported that Russia was on the verge of running out of arms.  The first such report was in March 2022, then it was repeated in April 2022, then July and September 2022.  Unknown to Western and Ukrainian experts and intelligence agents, the Russians were able to adopt measures to minimize the negative effects of the economic sanctions imposed on the country.  Apart from beating the sanctions, the Russians also ramped up arms production to offset losses in the battlefield.  As a result, of all the countries that are involved in the Russian – Ukrainian war, it is only Russia that successfully mobilized the country for war by ramping up the production of military weaponry. On the other hand, neither the US nor its European allies mobilized their arms manufacturing industries to ramp up production to meet the war demands of Ukraine.

Seventh, thus, while Russia continues to increase its arms production to meet the demands of the war, Ukraine is unable to produce its own weapons because Russia is constantly on the look out for any Ukrainian effort to produce any weapon to fill its dwindling stockpiles.  The difference in the quantity of arms possessed by both sides forces President Zelensky to travel to the West regularly to beg for arms supplies.  In fact, he visited Washington DC on December 12, 2023, to plead for the passage of a bill that will allow the US to continue funding his country’s war effort which is in a precarious situation.  Basically, the Ukrainians are fighting two wars, one is to campaign vigorously for continuing Western financial and military support and the other is to militarily hold the Russians back so that their forces do not crash for lack of weapons. It is not easy for President Zelensky to travel around Europe and the US to beg for continuing support.

Eighth, the more the war is stalemated, the more Russia is going to produce more weapons with a view of attacking Ukraine constantly, thereby causing more damage to the already devastated infrastructure.  Eventually, Russia might decide to expand its territorial control if it realizes that Ukraine is on the verge of collapsing militarily.  To avoid such a development, it is necessary for the Ukrainian Government to reinforce its military forces while looking for a way to negotiate an end to the war. To avoid a sudden collapsing of the Ukrainian military forces due to lack of weapons, it is necessary for the US and its NATO allies to continue to fund Ukraine while encouraging the country’s leaders to negotiate for a face-saving way out of the imbroglio.

Ninth, a Russian victory in Ukraine increases the concern in Europe that Russia might expand the war with the hope of recreating a Soviet-like empire by reincorporating some Eastern European countries into the Russian federation.  The concern is prompted by the fact that most NATO countries have almost exhausted their military stockpiles.  This means that if Russia were to advance farther west, many European countries would be left unprotected after expending a considerable quantity of their military hardware in Ukraine.  Again, Con Coughlin noted:

The prospect of Russia intensifying the threat it poses to European security in the event of Putin achieving only modest gains in Ukraine has prompted a number of prominent European military experts to question openly NATO’s preparedness for meeting such a challenge. A recent defence conference in Berlin was treated to a doomsday scenario whereby Europe risked suffering the same fate as the Holy Roman Empire under Napoleon, and being “washed away” in a future conflict with Russia because of NATO’s inability to defend Europe’s eastern flank. (2023, December 7).

The concern about European unpreparedness to face a Russian westward movement is being expressed in Germany by some officials. Reuters reported that the German Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces stated that the German military is suffering from shortage of weapons now than before the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.  Eva Hoegl stated “The Bundeswehr has too little of everything, and it has even less since (Russia’s invasion (2023, March 14). This sentiment is also being expressed in other parts of Europe as Russia seems to have a military advantage over Ukraine in the war.

Tenth, as the war reaches a stalemate, thereby informing discerning minds about the possibility of Russia winning the war and Ukraine’s defeat, many Ukrainians are beginning to dodge or avoid the military draft, unlike during the early phase of the war when the level of patriotism was very high, fearful that they would be sent to fight a war with no hope of military victory.  A war with no hope of victory implies that it is fruitless to enlist in the armed forces, except one wish to die for nothing.  Thus, many young Ukrainians are fleeing the country to avoid being drafted. Michael Murphy described the development:

Ukrainian men are trekking through mountains to dodge conscription, according to border officials.

Soldiers armed with Kalashnikov rifles and dressed in white camouflage are regularly intercepting fighting age men attempting to flee Ukraine via its snowy, mountainous border with Romania, a Ukrainian border official told the Washington Post (2023, December 8).

Eleventh, as the impression is being created that Russia is winning the war and Ukraine is not featuring well, its immediate neighbors to the West, including Poland, Germany, and the Baltic states of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and probably Norway are worried that Russia might come after them.  This concern could force them to act independently rather than follow a collective NATO plan to deal with the Russian threat.  An individual effort to shore up their territories could lead to rivalry among neighbors, thereby playing to the strategic advantage of Russia.

Moreover, the threat of Russia’s westward movement after the war with Ukraine could tempt some European Union members to blame the United States for putting them in the predicament, instead of accepting responsibility for pushing Ukraine to stand toe to toe and fight Russia, a military superpower in a conventional war.  Some might begin to lay the groundwork for a European defense system and rely less on NATO which is led by the United States that is thousands of miles away from the European mainland.

Failure to Pay Attention to the Cold War and Russian Concerns about NATO’s Eastward Expansion

Ukraine would not have been caught in this unpleasant situation if its political and military leaders had paid attention to the history of the Cold War and adopted neutrality as a policy to escape being caught in the power struggle between the United States and Russia.  Additionally, if the country’s leaders had systematically analyzed the political developments following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, they would not have exposed their country and citizens to the harrowing war that has devastated the country.  Instead of doing so, they were carried away by emotion and fell prey to the big power play by the United States and the NATO.

Thus, they failed to realize that Russia is a military superpower like the United States and China, with thousands of nuclear warheads that is very difficult to subdue militarily.  Likewise, President Volodymyr Zelensky and his advisers did not seem to pay attention to the fact that Russia had insisted as far back as 1991 during negotiations to reunite East Germany with West Germany that it would not tolerate NATO eastward expansion to its borders.  It seemed that both the Soviet and Western allies agreed in various high-level meetings involving President Mihail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, Soviet Union Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnazde, President George Bush Sr. of the United States,  US Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker,  former CIA Director Robert Gates, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, German Foreign Minister  Hans-Dietrich Gensher, President Francois Mitterrand of France, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of United Kingdom,  British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the German Democratic Republic’s Foreign minister Osker Fischer, and NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner that NATO would not expand eastwards toward Russia (“NATO Expansion:  What Gorbachev Heard,” December 12, 2017).

Even US officials were aware of the danger of expanding NATO towards the Russian border. George Kennan, the US architect of the Western containment policy against communism and Soviet expansion warned about the danger by saying: 

expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking …” (“Noted: George Kennan on NATO Expansion. (n.d.);  Goldgeier, June 1, 1999).

Likewise, William Burns, the former US ambassador to Russia and CIA director, tended to agree with George Kennan by stating, “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite not just Putin” (Cohen, March 27, 2022).  The New York Times felt the possibility of Russian aggressive rection toward NATO expanding eastwards by writing:

After a decade of NATO expansion into the former Communist bloc, a resurgent Russia

Is now vigorously opposing membership for Georgia and Ukraine and pressing those already in the alliance with threats should Poland and the Czech Republic cooperate with the United States on missile defense” (Shanker, September 18, 2008).

The Germans too knew that Russia will not take it kindly as NATO expands eastward. Hence on February 10, 1990, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said, “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity” (“NATO Expansion:  What Gorbachev Heard,” December 12, 2017).  It should be recalled that former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev warned against expanding NATO eastward toward Russia while addressing US Congress in 1997 “You cannot humiliate a people without consequences” (“Gorbachev warns Congress against NATO expansion,” April 16, 1997).

There is no doubt that the Ukrainian leadership was keenly aware of the danger of NATO moving towards the Russian border, yet decided to go along with the idea of aligning with NATO against Russia which shares a border with the country.  The fact that the Ukrainian leadership knew the risk of taking side in a power struggle between global military superpowers is supported by a revelation made by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel indicating that the Minsk Agreement was only a ploy to allow the Ukrainian military to build up and prepare for war against Russia.  She made the revelation while being interviewed by Die Zeit by saying the 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give time to Ukraine. It…used this time to become stronger as can be seen today. The Ukraine of 2014-2015 is not the modern Ukraine.”  (Kuzmarov. 2022, December 19).

The implication being that both the West and the Ukrainian leadership made a conscious choice to prepare for war even before Russia invaded on February 24, 2022.  This further meant that Ukraine adopted war as a strategy to deal with Russia. The Angela Merkel revelation tended to support the Russian view that it had to invade Ukraine since the country had prepared militarily to threaten its territorial integrity and sphere of influence. Thus, the Ukrainian leadership decided to take the Russian bull by its horns and openly aligned with NATO to prepare to fight Russia. To reinforce its position, the leadership enunciated incredulous policy goals which included driving out Russia militarily from its territory, effecting a regime change in Russia and ushering in a democratic system in the country.  This meant that the die was already casted before Russia actually invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.  

Lessons Learned and Inferences Drawn from the Ukrainian Imbroglio

The political and military leadership of small to medium size countries should learn from the untenable Ukrainian situation.  Thus, many lessons and inferences can be drawn from the Ukrainian imbroglio.

First, it is critical for political and military leaders to clearly identify the strategic interests of their states before embarking on a journey that could embroiled them in a conflict. This must be done using the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) model in an objective manner.  The purpose is to make sure that political and military leaders do not embroil their states in unwarranted regional and global political and military conflicts that can devour them.  

Second, it is strategically important to depend less on foreign financial and military assistance in making decisions about war and peace.  The reason is that the more a particular state depends on the financial and military assistance or aid of another, it is going to overrate its military capability and underestimate the military capability of its potential opponents, thereby getting involved in conflict situations it would have completely avoided.  It is obvious that Ukrainian political and military leaders had their military capability inflated based on promises made by the NATO and other European countries.  In other words, if Ukrainian leaders had not put their hope on NATO providing them essential sophisticated military equipment, they would not have decided to confront Russia toe-to-toe in a grinding conventional war, knowing full well that Russia is a military superpower and has the economies of large-scale military technological production and has assorted categories of military weaponry.  In other words, no political or military leader should evaluate his or her country’s military capability to fight a superior military power based on the assumptions or promises of support coming from the outside.

Third, it is strategically significant for any sovereign state to avoid depending on foreign military and financial aid.  Why, it is a common saying that nothing goes for nothing.  Thus, the more a state depends on another state for financial and military support, it is going to dance to the musical tune of the donor  state.  In other words, the country that provides the assistance is definitely going to get something back in return.  Quite often, the receiving country ends up giving back a major facet of its assets or resources or ability to make independent decisions.  Apparently, Ukraine sacrificed its ability to make an independent evaluation of the Russian invasion of the country since it depended on the decisions of its outside supporters.  It is widely reported that both Russia and Ukraine came very close to making a peace deal through the diplomatic effort of Turkey to end the war in March 2022, a month after the Russian invasion but the deal did not go through, perhaps, due to outside influence on the Ukrainian leadership. Joe Walsh reported:

Russian and Ukrainian negotiators are weighing a potential deal that would require Ukraine to be militarily neutral—barring the country from joining NATO or hosting foreign bases—but allow it to seek security guarantees from other countries and pursue EU membership, according to the Financial Times, which cited four unnamed sources.

Ukrainian politician and negotiator David Arakhamia told the newspaper these security guarantees could require countries like the United States to assist Ukraine if it is attacked, an arrangement he compared to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense rule (2022, March 28).

It seemed that the United Kingdom (UK) was opposed to the negotiation between Ukraine and Russia.  Jake Johnson reported about the UK intervention to stop the negotiations:

Johnson’s meeting with cabinet ministers came weeks after the Ukrainian newspaper Ukrayinska Pravda reported that during a visit to Kyiv in April, the British leader urged Zelenskyy to cut off diplomatic talks with Putin, insisting that the Russian president “should be pressured, not negotiated with.”

Peace talks have since been at a standstill as Russian forces ramp up their assault on eastern Ukraine and the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States prepare to arm Ukrainian forces with longer-range rocket systems, heightening fears of a broader war between Russia and NATO (2022, June 7. Borsi Johnson says Ukraine should not accept “bad peace” with Russia. Common Dreams. (2022, June 7).

There is no doubt that if Ukraine had not depended on outside financial and military support, a peace agreement would have been sealed.  Unfortunately, it had to take the position of its outside partners into consideration in negotiating with Russia, thereby complicating the situation for Ukraine’s political and military leadership as Britian opposed the idea.

It should be noted that Nigeria and other members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) almost fell into the Ukrainian trap when they decided to militarily intervene in the Republic of Niger and restore a democratically elected leader who was overthrown in a military coup.  It was apparent that the decision of the leadership of the ECOWAS to intervene was greatly encouraged by France, US, and other Western countries, against the general interests of Africa.  Fortunately, the pressure from West African citizens and interest groups across the African continent forced the ECOWAS leadership to avoid being trapped in a war that would have seriously impacted the West African region negatively.

It should also be noted that the Republic of Georgia too almost got itself entangled in the feud between NATO and Russia.  Luckily for Georgia, the destruction inflicted on Ukraine has enabled many Georgians to realize that the best policy for a country that shares a border with a military superpower is to adopt a policy of neutrality. It should be recalled that Switzerland survived both the 1st and 2nd World wars unscathed because it adopted neutrality.

Fourth, it is always preferable to have seasoned individuals become political and military leaders of any country so that they are not easily influenced by emotions to make costly decisions.  It is also important to have seasoned leaders who can stand their ground and defend the national interest without being compelled to embark on regional and global actions that are capable of seriously hurting their countries and citizens.

Fifth, in particular, African leaders should learn from the Ukrainian situation and stop travelling around the globe in search of foreign financial and military aid and rely more on themselves and their citizens to develop and modernize their countries.  In this regard, they should minimize attending conferences organized by other countries to woo and exploit them.  Likewise, they should be more careful before signing bilateral and multilateral treaties that often end up disadvantaging their countries and citizens.  

Sixth, it is necessary for less militarily powerful countries to avoid signing military cooperation treaties with militarily powerful countries.  The reason is that such treaties render them semiautonomous, even though they are sovereign states.  A treaty involves obligations, hence, as soon as one is signed, the signee must abide by the conditions of the treaty.  Quite often, the most dominant military powers will always have an advantage over the less militarily powerful members of any bilateral or multilateral treaty.  Indeed, Ukraine was not capable of making independent decisions that serve its strategic interest.

Seventh, there is no other option left than for the Ukrainian political and military leadership to consult with its Western partners and then negotiate with Russia to end the war.   A stalemate is not to the strategic advantage of Ukraine.  Ukraine needs an end to the war so that its millions of citizens who are wallowing in refugee camps can return to help rebuild the country.  Ukraine can easily be rebuilt due to the industrious nature of the citizens.  Its agricultural industry will rebound very quickly to continue to become a major supplier of agricultural products in the world.

Eighth, it is a grievous strategic flaw to underrate the military capability of potential military opponents.  It should be noted that the Ukrainian political and military leadership, following Western advice, underrated the military capability of the Russians to fight a grinding war.  As a result, when Russian forces retreated from Kiev and other parts of Ukraine, following the initial invasion, the readjustment of Russian forces was treated as a defeat for Russia and the military capability of Ukraine to fight toe-to-toe with the country was blown out of proportion.  Soltan Barany, like many other experts and intellectuals, characterized the Russian military readjustment of strategy as a failure.  Hence, he identified five major reasons why Russia failed militarily (Barany, 2023, January).Another Western writer too viewed the Russian tactical change of military plan as a sign of military failure and some sort of victory for Ukraine. Eugene Humer, a former intelligence officer wrote:

A year into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine, Russia has suffered a major strategic defeat, Ukraine has achieved a major strategic victory, and the West has demonstrated a combination of resolve, unity, and cohesion that few had expected. This, however, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, is not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

Ukrainians, having tasted victory on the battlefield and united in their desire for justice and revenge, cannot accept a land-for-peace compromise. For Putin, whose war it is primarily, compromise is not an option after the humiliation of the failed campaign in pursuit of his maximalist objectives. (Rumer, 2023, February 17).

   It was the euphoria over the Russian realignment of strategy and the perception in the West that the change in plan was a reflection of Russian military failure that led to the theorization that Ukraine’s military forces would be able to fight a grinding war with Russia until it is exhausted, thereby leading to a regime change and the democratization of Russia.  The euphoria also led the Ukrainian leadership to insist that it will fight until Russian troops are forced out of every inch of Ukrainian territory. The perception that the Russian military is weak probably compelled Ukrainian officials to insist on accomplishing six goals in the war with Russia.  The goals, as identified in an article titled “The Russo-Ukrainian War: It is Time for a Negotiated Settlement to Avoid Military Quagmire and a Possible 3rd World War,” included (1) push Russia out of its territory, (2) possibly defeat and degrade Russian military capability, (3) possibly initiate a regime change so that President Putin is removed from power in order to democratize Russia, (4) ensure severe global economic sanctions against Russia for invading the country, (5) demand compensation for the infrastructural damage and loss of life caused by the Russian invasion, (6) conduct international tribunal to try Russians who violate human rights by committing war crimes, and (7) eventually gain membership in the European Union and NATO (Soldak, 2022, June 5).

It was also the underrating of Russia that led the West and Ukraine to keep informing the world that Russia would soon run out of weapons.  This prediction was made repeatedly in March, April, June, July, and September 2022, as indicated earlier. In fact, some Western experts even predicted that due to poor Russian military performance, President Putin would announce a military victory on May 9, 2022, and pull his forces out of Ukraine to save face.  The Western and Ukrainian predictions were so much against Russia and in favor of Ukraine to the point that Ukraine’s top intelligence official, Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov predicted the possibility of Russia running out of weapons by saying:

“Russia has wasted huge amounts of human resources, armaments and materials. Its economy and production are not able to cover these losses. It’s changed its military chain of command. If Russia’s military fails in its aims this spring, it will be out of military tools (Hjelmagaard, 2023, March 2).The senior military intelligence officer made this prediction in early March 2023 about the possibility of Russia running out of weapons.

Here again, Ukraine fell for the so-called “less than capable Russian military might’ hype.  Unfortunately for Ukraine, by the end of November 2023, it is Russia that was predicted by both Western and Ukrainian experts and officials to collapse militarily that is standing strong and Ukraine is limping along while gasping for breath.  The Western nations now realized that it is their own stockpiles of weapons that are diminishing while Russia continues to build up its weaponry.  A German official acknowledged the fact that Germany is not equipped for an effective fighting force.  Reuters wrote: “The chief of the German army vented his frustration over what he sees as the long-running neglect of military readiness in his country in an unusual public rant a few hours after Russia invaded Ukraine, adding that the army was in bad shape (“German army chief ‘fed up’ with the neglect of country’s military.”

The German concern extends to the entire European continent, as analysts worry. The lack of European military preparedness is described below:

European militaries have now experienced decades of decline. Today, much of Europe’s military hardware is in a shocking state of disrepair. Too many of Europe’s forces aren’t ready to fight. Its fighter jets and helicopters aren’t ready to fly; its ships and submarines aren’t ready to sail; and its vehicles and tanks aren’t ready to roll. Europe lacks the critical capabilities for modern warfare, including so-called enabling capabilities—such as air-refueling to support fighter jets, transport aircraft to move troops to the fight, and the high-end reconnaissance and surveillance drones essential for modern combat. European forces aren’t ready to fight with the equipment they have, and the equipment they have isn’t good enough. (Bergmann, Lamond, and Cicarilli, 2021, June 1).

Ninth, the Russia – Ukraine war turned the Western media into a public relations medium for Ukraine as journalistic objectivity was openly sacrificed in support of Ukraine.  All the major Western news media networks including CNN, FOX, DW, New York Times, BBC, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Reuters, Le Monde, Le Figaro, Diet Zeit, WELT, Telewizja Polska, Fakt, and so on and so forth, became the mouthpieces of Ukraine and NATO. Even some of the experienced Western journalists sacrificed professionalism and became advocates for Ukraine.  Due to the unprofessional behavior of Western journalists in the coverage of the war, Western journalists have lost their respect in the non-Western world.  Increasingly, Western journalists are viewed as public relations agents of their countries and the West.  It is doubtful whether the Western media will be able to regain any atom of journalistic respect in the non-Western world again because of the unprofessional performance of the journalists.

Tenth, the war also highlighted the intellectual weaknesses of Western think-tanks and retired senior military officers.  Many researchers and experts who work for Western think-tanks also behaved like Western journalists and acted as advocates for Ukraine instead of providing objective analysis of the conflict.  They tended to agree with government positions in order to show their patriotism and devotion to the Western point of view.  The same goes for many retired Western senior military officers (four-star, three-star, two-star, and one-star generals) who spoke and wrote as if they were advocates for NATO and Ukraine instead of providing an objective analysis of the war that would have been helpful to Western and Ukrainian political and military leaders.  During the early phase of the war, it was more enlightening to listen to the analytical commentary of retired military officers from India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and those in Latin America than retired Western military officers who tended to speak as if they were obligated to support a particular point of view.  Many of them profoundly underestimated Russian military capability, thereby encouraging the Ukrainian political leadership to sacrifice the country. On the other hand, retired Western military officers like Col. Douglas MacGregor and Maj. William Scott Ritter who provided an objective appraisal of the war were and have been blatantly ignored by both government officials and the Western media because their analyses of the war are not in line with the adopted official position. So far, the analytical predictions of these two retired American officers and a few others seem to reflect the actuality of the situation on the ground in Ukrainian.

Eleventh, the Russia – Ukraine War clearly showed the danger that follows when propaganda is used excessively to an extent whereby decision-makers begin to believe in them instead of listening to the soldiers who are fighting the battles on the ground.  In other words, political and military leaders should always avoid treating propaganda as facts, otherwise, they would end up holding the short end of the stick and fail miserably.

References

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Bergmann, M., Lamond, J., and Siena Cicarilli, S. (2021, June 1). The case foe EU defense. American Progress.  https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/)

Coughlin, C. (2022, December 7). Putin is close to victory. Europe should be terrified. The Telegraph. https;//news.yahoo.com/putin-close-victory-europe-terrified-060000644.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAA.

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Hjelmagaard, K.  (2023, March 2). Russia will be out of ‘ military tools’ by spring, Ukraine’s top military spy. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2023/03/02/war-top-ukraine-spy-says-russia-out-of-military-tools/11310628002/.

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Kuzmarov. J.  (2022, December 19). Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel admits that Minsk peace agreements were part of a scheme for Ukraine to buy time to prepare for war.  Global Research. https://www.globalresearch.ca/former-german-chancellor-merkel-admits-minsk-peace-agreements-part-scheme-ukraine-buy-time-pre

Murphy, M. (2023, December 8). Ukrainian men trekking through mountains to dodge conscription. The Telegraph. https://news.yahoo.com/ukrainian-men-trekking-mountains-dodge-154239237.html.

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Roy, D.  (2023, June 8). How bad is Ukraine’s humanitarian crisis a year later. Council on Foreign Relations. https//www.cfr.org/in-brief/Ukraine-humanitarian-crisis-refuggees-aid.

Rumer, E.  (2023, February 17). Putin’s war against Ukraine: The end of the beginning. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/17/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-end-of-beginning-pub-89071 ).

Slisco, A. (2023, December 4). Ukraine official accuse Zelensky about lying about the war. Newsweek. Https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-official-accuses-zelensky–lying-1849427).   

Soldak,  (2022, June 5). What is Ukraine’s end goal with its war with Russia: Voices from the Battlefield. Forbes, Retrieved June 25, 2022, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/06/05/what-is-ukraines-end-goal-in-its-war-with-russia-voices-from-the-battlefield/?sh=737badfd10b4.

Sullivan, B. (February 24, 2022).  How NATO’s expansion helped drive Putin to invade Ukraine.  NPR. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://www.npr.org/2022/01/29/1076193616/ukraine-russia-nato-explainer).

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